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In the early 1950s the imminence and inevitability of a third world war was widely
accepted. America had lost its atomic monopoly, Russia promoted itself as the
defender of world peace against the war-mongering West and Korea had turned the
Cold War hot. In Australia, the Menzies government prepared the country for combat
while the fledgling peace movement mobilised public opinion against war. This
article will examine the contrasting reactions of both government and peace
movement to the threat of war through the prism of the 1953 Convention on War
and Peace, an event that has been overlooked by historians. The article will also
analyse and evaluate Menzies’ political assault on the Convention: the context, the
rationale and the consequences.
O N  1  J U L Y  1 9 4 9 , in the Melbourne home of Reverend Victor James, a Unit-
arian Church minister, the Australian Peace Council was born. Also present
were two other ‘peace parsons’, Reverend Frank Hartley and Reverend
Alf Dickie.1 Its first initiative was innocuous: it launched an essay competition
for all school children, aged twelve to sixteen, on ‘Why I Want World Peace’.
The winning entry received a five-guinea prize.2 The Australian Peace
Council’s next initiative was more auspicious. It organised an immensely
popular four day Peace Congress in Melbourne in April 1950. The Dean of
Canterbury, Dr Hewlett Johnson, nicknamed the ‘Red Dean’ by the British
press for his pro-Soviet views, spoke at the Exhibition Buildings and over
twelve thousand people attended.3 One who was there wrote, soon after, that
the Peace Congress:
1 Marion Hartley, The Truth shall Prevail: The Reverend Francis John Hartley (Melbourne: Spectrum,
1982), 251; Ralph Gibson, One Woman’s Life: A Memoir of Dorothy Gibson (Sydney: Hale & Ire-
monger, 1980), 66.
2 Records of the Victorian Peace Council (hereafter VPC), University of Melbourne Archives (here-
after UMA), 80:172, Box 6, File 2 (‘Peace Congress 1950’).
3 See Peace: The Journal of the Australian Peace Council 1, no. 1 (April 1950); National Archives of
Australia (hereafter NAA), (NSW Branch), SP 368/1, 7/32/4; NAA A5954/69, 2127/1; Sun,
20 April 1950, 13; Hewlett Johnson, Searching for Light: An Autobiography (London: Michael
Joseph, 1968), 277–8. In 1951, when Johnson received the Stalin Peace Prize, he told an audience
in Moscow that Stalin was the ‘greatest man in the world’ and the ‘greatest fighter for peace’. NAA
A1838/1, 69/1/1/16 Pt.3.
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was a magnificent experience. I’ve never been to anything like it—and the old Dean is a
most wonderful man. He just exudes strength and goodness—and he made a great impres-
sion on everyone who heard him. It certainly gave a Peace Movement a fillip here …4
The size of the audience was indicative of the depth of its fears. This was a gener-
ation for whom war, as Allan Bullock noted, was not a remote hypothesis but a
recent and terrible experience.5 This was a time when the bolts of the Iron
Curtain had slammed shut and when the world was dividing into two armed
camps, each haunted by the growing spectre of atomic annihilation.6
Five months after the Peace Congress, on 20 September 1950, the Prime
Minister, Robert Menzies, delivered a solemn national radio broadcast. It was full
of foreboding. Within three years, he stated, Australia would be involved in a
third world war. The Korean war, now three months old, was merely a fore-
taste—an instance, he said, of international communism testing the strength of
the West. In two further broadcasts, on 22 and 25 September, he again spoke of
impending global conflict and the urgent need to prepare the country for war.7
That same month, in one of the most momentous decisions of the Cold War, he
agreed—secretly and without any consultation with his Cabinet—to the British
request to test atomic bombs in Australia.8 War preparations commenced four
months later when he established the top-secret National Security Resources
Board, whose task was to mobilise, coordinate and integrate all public and private
sectors of the economy. This would enable the implementation of a vast defence
and development programme. It would also lay the foundations of a national
security state—essential if World War III, now believed imminent, was to be
fought effectively.9 Over the next three years these two developments—a left-
wing movement working, strenuously, for peace and a conservative government
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4 Letter from Amirah Turner, Richmond, to Stephen and Nita Murray-Smith, Prague, 14 June 1950.
Stephen Murray-Smith papers, State Library of Victoria (hereafter SLV), MSS 8272, Box 273/1–2,
Correspondence 1949–50. This was confirmed by Bernie Taft who was also present: he was
‘terribly impressed’ with the ‘Red Dean’ whose speech and appearance he still ‘vividly remem-
bers’. Similarly, he believed his visit to Melbourne provided a ‘rallying point’ for the embryonic
peace movement. Conversation with Bernie Taft, 30 October 2001.
5 Allan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 845.
6 See, for example, leaflet What are YOU doing to Work for Peace? Save ME from ATOMIC WAR,
[Melbourne, 1950], Ian Turner papers, Noel Butlin Archives Centre, ANU, P2/4/17. Ban-the-
Bomb petitions received widespread support (see Keith McEwan, Once a Jolly Comrade (Brisbane:
Jacaranda, 1966), 21 partly due to the successful detonation of an atom bomb by the Soviet Union
only six months before which made the spectre more tangible.
7 A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, 1944-1978 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press,
1999), 169–70. Full transcripts can be found in Current Notes on International Affairs 21, 9, (Septem-
ber 1950).
8 Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapons Trials in Australia (London: HMSO
Books, 1987), 19; Roger Cross, Fallout: Hedley Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia
(Adelaide: Wakefield Press, 2001), 1.
9 L.J. Louis, Menzies’ Cold War: A Reinterpretation (Melbourne: Red Rag Publications, 2001), chapters
2–4. Similarly, David Lowe commented: ‘A third world war, starting with aerial and atomic
attacks, was not only an anticipated possibility, but it was the basis on which military and
economic planning should proceed’, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War
(Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999), 9.
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preparing, secretly, for war—converged. With the 1953 Australian Convention
on Peace and War, they collided. 
The Convention and the debates it provoked provide a sharp insight into the
polarising impact of Cold War. This article will use the Convention as a case study
of the character of anti-communism in the 1950s. It will argue that, despite the
successful efforts of the organisers to ensure that the Convention was not
communist-controlled—and I will suggest that it was neither inspired nor manip-
ulated by the Communist Party of Australia (CPA)—the climate of virulent anti-
communism prevented the Menzies’ government and the security services from
perceiving  distinctions. Within the moral myopia of the Cold War, any peace
activity was seen as subversive. Nuances and ambiguities simply did not exist.
The 1953 Convention was a clear exception to the usual pattern of CPA control
over the peace movement in the 1950s, but the prevailing political environment
necessarily linked peace with communism. Pacifist clergymen who opposed the
Korean War or the development of nuclear weapons were therefore tarred with
the communist brush. There could be no such thing as legitimate opposition to
government policy on war and peace. On these issues, as we shall see, conserva-
tive anti-communism decreed that all critics—whether or not they were commu-
nist—must be silenced. The second aim is rectify a significant historiographical
oversight. Notwithstanding a comprehensive if partisan discussion of the
Convention by one of its organisers,10 and a vast amount of relevant archival
material,11 the event has been largely overlooked not only by historians of the
post-war period but, more surprisingly, by historians of the peace movement.12
The one exception is a brief discussion in a broad-ranging chapter on peace activ-
ities throughout the 1950s.13 Thirdly, I will attempt to illustrate how fractured
250 Australian Historical Studies, 122, 2003
10 J.E. Owen, The Road to Peace. An Experiment in Friendship Across Barriers (Melbourne: Hawthorn
Press, 1954).
11 VPC records, UMA, 80:172, Box 6; Murray-Smith papers, SLV, MSS 8272, Box 282/2–1 (‘Peace
Convention material 1953’); Friends’ Peace Committee (Victoria) papers, SLV, MS 11196, Box
2742/5. See also NAA A462/4, 211/2/23; A1838, 1542/591; A6122, 1270–1274 (volumes 1–5).
12 Because, as we shall see, the Convention does not ‘fit the pattern’ of most post-war peace activity,
it usually receives, at most, cursory analysis or fleeting attention. See: W.E. Gollan, Bond or Free:
The Peace and Disarmament Movement (Sydney: NSW Teachers’ Federation, 1987); J.P. O’Brien,
Towards Peace (Brisbane: Shape, 1992); Hartley, The Truth Shall Prevail; Malcolm Saunders and
Ralph Summy, The Australian Peace Movement: A Short History (Canberra: Peace Research Centre,
Australian National University, 1986); Ralph Summy and Malcolm Saunders, ‘Disarmament and
the Australian Peace Movement: A Brief History’, in World Review, 26 (December 1987): 15–52;
Ralph Summy, ‘The Australian Peace Council and the Anti-Communist Milieu, 1949-1965’, in
Peace Movements and Political Cultures, eds Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1988); J.P. Forrester, Fifteen Years of Peace Fronts (Sydney: n.p.,
[1964]); Valerie O’Byrne., ‘The Peace Parsons: The Involvement of the Clergy in Peace Move-
ments During the 1950s’ (MA thesis, Monash University, 1984); Jan Sullivan-Talty, ‘The
Australian Peace Movement 1949-1964: A Study in Social Protest with Specific Reference to the
Australian Peace Council’, (BA (Hons) thesis, University of Wollongong, 1988).
13 Barbara Carter, ‘The Peace Movement in the 1950s’, in Better Dead than Red. Australia’s First Cold
War: 1945–1959 Volume 2, eds Ann Curthoys and John Merritt, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986),
65–6. There is also a useful description of the Convention in Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and
Reformists. Communism and the Australian Labour Movement, 1920-1955 (Canberra: ANU Press,
1975), 274–5.
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were the early to mid 1950s; the article will reveal this period to contain severe
sectarian, cultural and ideological fault lines. It will therefore contribute to and
supplement an emerging historiography14 that contests  the received wisdom of
the 1950s as years of ‘suburban stability and security’, a period of ‘complacency,
conformity [and] a kind of cosy comfortableness’.15
Prelude
Between the Melbourne Peace Congress in April 1950 and the Convention on
Peace and War in September 1953, the peace movement was vibrant and ener-
getic. It generated sufficient support to send Australian delegates to the Second
World Peace Congress in Warsaw in November 1950, to a youth peace festival in
Berlin in October 1951, to the Asia and Pacific Peace Conference in Peking in
September 1952, and to the Congress of Peoples for Peace in Vienna in January
1953. It also organised a massive Carnival for Peace and Friendship in Sydney in
March 1952. Each of these activities was preceded by innumerable public
meetings to popularise as well as to fund-raise, each involved vast amounts of
printed propaganda material and organisational effort, and each was challenged,
attacked or undermined by the Menzies government. 
In addition to these major events, a plethora of activities was also under-
taken: newspaper advertisements, letters to the editor, receptions, petition
signing, art exhibitions, dances, fairs, forums. For example, in the first six months
of 1953, the Victorian Peace Council or its affiliate, the Peace Quest Forum,
organised the following: a delegation to Canberra to request the Menzies govern-
ment to press for a ceasefire in Korea; a three-day citizens’ conference on peace
and disarmament in the Assembly Hall in Collins Street; a Big Gala Peace Ball in
North Melbourne Town Hall; a ‘clemency vigil’ outside the US Consulate protest-
ing against the imminent execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg; screenings at
numerous suburban and rural Town Halls and churches of the Joris Ivens film
Peace Will Win;16 a well-attended ceasefire rally on the Yarra Bank; and weekly
lunch-hour forums in the Assembly Hall. Speakers at these weekly forums
included the Olympics athletics coach Percy Cerrutty, on ‘Youth for Battlefields
or Playing Fields’; the historian, Norman Harper, on ‘Should the United Nations
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14 In particular, John Murphy, Imagining the Fifties:  Private Sentiment and Political Culture in Menzies’
Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press/Pluto Press, 2000).
15 Stephen Alomes, Mark Dober and Donna Hellier, ‘The Social context of Postwar conservatism’,
in Australia’s First Cold War. Vol.1 Society, Communism and Culture, eds Ann Curthoys and John
Merritt (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 1; John Murphy and Judith Smart, eds, Australian Histor-
ical Studies 109, October 1997, special issue, The Forgotten Fifties: Aspects of Australian Society and
Culture in the 1950s, 1.
16 Ivens’ films, particularly The Spanish Earth (1937), Power and the Land (1941) and Indonesia Calling
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be Re-organised?’; the scientist, Jack Legge, on ‘Science: War or Peace?’; and the
Reverend Alan Walker on ‘Peace and the Hydrogen Bomb’.17
The range and frequency of these activities was symptomatic of the increas-
ingly broad front that the peace movement was attempting to capture. They also
provided a strong organisational base for planning the September Convention on
Peace and War. The Convention was the brainchild of Reverend Allan D. Brand,
a Methodist Minister of Glebe and president of the New South Wales Peace
Council. He returned from the Vienna Peace Congress in early 1953 convinced
‘that instead of leaving it to governments, the people themselves, through open
discussion of many viewpoints, could begin to determine vital policies and
events’.18 He and a group of ten clergymen, mostly Protestant, drew up a state-
ment summarised by its concluding sentence: ‘Peace cannot wait—it must be
won’.19 Peace would triumph when negotiation displaced war in the settlement
of international disputes. This position was confirmed, it seemed, by the cessa-
tion, through negotiation, of the three year-old Korean war in July.20 An execu-
tive committee, consisting mostly of Anglican and Protestant clergymen was
formed, the first of eight Convention Bulletins was published, halls were booked,
invitations issued, sponsors secured, and an intensive publicity campaign
commenced.21 With three thousand delegates anticipated, expectations were
high and aims were grandiose: to ‘demonstrate the desire of the Australian
people for peace’ and to ‘challenge the government to frame policies that
strengthen peace’. 
The response by the Government will be discussed later but from the outset
a major obstacle confronting those preparing for the Convention was the
virtual blackout imposed by the media. The organisers were denied the normal
channels of publicity: the press, radio and advertising space on trains, trams,
ferries and buses. This was neither a unique nor recent phenomenon and,
to many activists on the Left, quite predictable. But it ambushed Protestant
252 Australian Historical Studies, 122, 2003
17 See various issues of Working for Peace in Personal papers of Reverend Alf Dickie, UMA, 83:81,
Box 2/19. Further details of these activities can be found in the Friends’ Peace Committee papers,
SLV, MS 11196, Box 2742/3. See also Hartley, The Truth Shall Prevail, 71.
18 On the same trip Reverend Brand travelled behind the ‘iron curtain’; see his I Preached Peace in
U.S.S.R. and China, NSW Peace Council, Sydney [1953]. In Cold War parlance, therefore, he was
a ‘pink parson’.
19 See statement accompanied by letter, dated 1 May 1953, from Reverend A. Brand to unnamed
invitees, NAA A1533/34, 53/266
20 See leaflet Truce in Korea Affects You. So Does the Australian Convention on Peace and War, Sydney
[August 1953].
21 See This is to Invite Your Interest in an Australian Convention on Peace and War (Sydney [July 1953])
and numerous advertising flyers, brochures and leaflets in Murray-Smith papers, SLV, MSS 8272,
Box 282/2-1 (‘Peace Convention material 1953’). Sponsors included academics such as Profes-
sors W. Macmahon Ball, Manning Clark, A.D. Hope, G.V. Portus, Ian Maxwell, Brian Lewis; Dr
Geoffrey Serle and Dr Lloyd Churchward and Mr J.F. Cairns. Macmahon Ball’s name was given
prominence in 1953. He ceased being a pacifist in 1938 (see Carolyn Rasmussen, The Lesser Evil?
Opposition to War and Fascism in Australia, 1920-1941 (Melbourne: History Department, University
of Melbourne, 1992), 120) but by 1959, his attitude to the peace movement had significantly
altered (see Fred Wells, The Peace Racket (Sydney [1964]), 16–7).
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clergymen unaccustomed to the heavy hand of censorship. As an indignant
Reverend J.F. Long, wrote: ‘there is no justification for [this] Press blanket …
[that] has prevented the public from knowing what is going on.’22 The Victo-
rian Convention Committee devised various means of breaking the ‘conspiracy
of silence’. First, it solicited donations for the specific purpose of buying
substantial space in the Age, Argus and Herald to advertise both the Convention
on Peace and War and the preparatory meetings in Melbourne’s Assembly Hall.
These were held on 7 August, 15 August and 11 September. Second, it commu-
nicated with ‘all ministers of religion, doctors, lawyers and other professional
and business men’ in particular localities, requested that one or some of them
convene a local meeting, and arranged a Committee member to address such a
meeting.23 Third, it compiled mailing lists of people ‘of the widest possible char-
acter and high standing’, drawn from ‘all religious, political and other affilia-
tions’. Members of the Committee then interviewed or, more often, wrote to
these people seeking their assistance. Sometimes the plea fell on deaf ears so at
least one circular contained a tone of desperation: ‘Please do what you can, and
please—please—PLEASE do it immediately’24
For ten weeks the Convention committee and a large swag of volunteers
prepared for those five days in September. The organisers desired an ecumenical
gathering. They desired ‘to bring together all lines of thought, to discover what
basis of agreement is possible’.25 The programme was structured so that sectional
domination by any of the participating organisations would be prevented.26
Individual participants, each paying £1 registration fee, would have full speaking,
voting and/or abstention rights. In addition, a broad range of ‘special sections’
was planned. They embraced women, youth, trade unionists, scientists, and
people from Churches, business and cultural pursuits.27 As one the Convention
committee members stated: ‘We will be a very mixed bunch of people. If any-
body goes to [the Convention] with an axe to grind, than I am sorry for him.
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22 Murray-Smith papers, SLV, MS 8272 Box 282/2–1, correspondence, 17 August 1953. An example
of this ‘silence barrier’ occurred when Reverend Dr A.H. Wood made an ‘important announce-
ment’ regarding the imminent Convention on Peace and War which he then sent to the editors
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25 Reverend Norman St. Clair Anderson in Voice, August 1953, 5.
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27 See The Peacemaker, August 1953, 3.
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He is going to find himself out of touch. For this Convention will belong to the
people who attend and to the people of Australia’.28 Thus, the Convention was
to be inclusive of opinion, broad in representation and ecclesiastical in emphasis.
The Convention
The Australian Convention on Peace and War commenced at 10.00 a.m. on
Saturday 26 September. The venue, the Sydney Town Hall, was draped with the
Australian flag and a huge banner reading ‘Negotiation Must Replace War’. The
first keynote speaker was Rev Eric Owen, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church
of Victoria and chairman of the Convention’s Victorian Committee. During his
opening address, Owen stated:
This is a historic moment in the life of Australia. We must recognise that we
are all Australians prepared to bridge the divisions in the cause of peace. We are
here to find our own common humanity. If war came along tomorrow unity
would be our keynote. We have to capture that spirit in the service of peace, and
show the people of Australia that we have found this communion with each
other, this sense of being one people in one God, one people in the eyes of
eternity.29
According to Geoff Chapman, an observer, his speech was ‘very impressive’
and his ‘sincerity was obvious’.30 Given that none of the major Sydney news-
papers sent a reporter to cover any aspect of the Convention, the report of
Chapman, a member of the Melbourne University Students’ Representative
Council, gives us a unique account of the five days of the Convention. His report
was neither partisan nor sanitised.31 After attending Sub-Commission A1 (whose
brief was to find consensus around the question ‘Are peaceful solutions possible
in present war and war-danger areas?’), he commented:
I made known to the Chairman my distress that the speakers seemed one-sided … Ken
Widdowson [sic] told me that the same line was run in his sub-commission. I resolved to
formally withdraw the S.R.C. in the morning. However, on further consideration I decided
to leave it another day.32
254 Australian Historical Studies, 122, 2003
28 Murray-Smith papers, SLV, MS 8272 Box 282/2–1, Convention News [nd]. 
29 Australian Convention on Peace and War Record (Sydney [1953]), 4. This was a handsomely-
produced sixteen page booklet which was widely distributed after the Convention. According to
this Record, Owen’s address on the final day was ‘inspired’ and ‘brought the audience to its feet
in prolonged applause’.
30 VPC Records, UMA, 80:172, Box 6, File 3, ‘Report of the S.R.C. Observer to the Australian
Convention on Peace and War’, unpublished twelve page typescript, 3 October 1953, 1.
31 This was in contrast to, for example, the reports of the Convention in the communist press such
as Challenge, published by the Eureka Youth League (EYL), a Communist Party ‘front’ organisa-
tion. It was not correct for Tribune (30 September 1953, 12) to claim that ‘Trib [sic] alone has
given a faithful account of the Convention’.
32 ‘Report of the S.R.C. Observer to the Australian Convention on Peace and War’.
03 Deery  15/7/03  5:41 PM  Page 254
The following day there was a groundswell of support for a more inclusive and
less doctrinaire approach. According to Chapman, ‘had yesterday’s performance
continued, I would have been obliged to withdraw’.33 He stayed until the end,
taking detailed notes on the debates, addresses and resolutions. He also described
how some discussions were ‘heated’ (particularly in relation to the issue of recog-
nition of China) or ‘disorderly’ or ‘nebulous’ and how one unanswered question
posed by Dame Mary Gilmore (‘Why are A bombs let off in the desert instead of
on the ice caps at the North and South poles?’) left the audience, understandably,
‘puzzled’.34 Such qualitative judgements are absent from the ‘official’ published
versions of the Convention.35 His summation of the Convention therefore would
appear to have a large measure of authenticity and reliability.
Although the Convention was broadly representative of the Australian
community in that delegates came from all states and from many occupations, it
was not a genuine cross section of Australian political opinion, for it was obvious
that most of the delegates were more or less of left wing sympathy. Right wing
views were considered, but there was really no one there to advance them …
His subsequent remarks are highly pertinent in the light of the allegations
made by Menzies, ASIO and other government departments—discussed below—
that the Convention was communist inspired, controlled or influenced.
The most striking feature of the Convention was the very sincerity and enthusiasm of
those present. During the discussions on the drafts they made really honest efforts to find
areas of agreement and to effect compromises … [They] showed good faith and generos-
ity and subdued their personal opinions to find common ground … Everyone was free to
say what they liked and had every opportunity to do so … Standard of discussion was on
the whole low, and points to a very real need for extended Adult Education facilities …
[The Convention] was dominated by no particular group or political party…36
None of these comments is characteristic of meetings organised or conducted by
the Communist Party of Australia  during its Cold War embrace of ‘high Stalin-
ism’. In fact, stated Chapman, ‘it was very interesting to see a Communist Party
member, known for his keen mind and decisive personality, refraining from any
constructive part in the proceedings’.37
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Youth Committee of the Australian Convention on Peace and War, no. 1, November 1953, 5.
34 This was omitted from the CPA report of Gilmore’s speech which focused instead on the
prolonged cheering she received. Tribune, 30 September 1953, 3. 
35 See, for example Australian Convention on Peace and War Bulletin 8, 4 December 1953, in VSL, MS
11196, 2742/5.
36 Ibid, 11. His comment on the standard of discussion was echoed in a confidential appraisal (‘For
Private Circulation Amongst Friends’) by one Quaker, James Newell, who told a meeting of the
Society of Friends: ‘the whole discussion, in some commissions at least, tended to be superficial’.
Records of the Friends’ Peace Committee (Victoria), SLV, MS 11196, Box 2742/5.
37 Australian Convention on Peace and War Bulletin 8, 4 December 1953, 12. Similarly, see W.A. Wood’s
article, ‘Came as Strangers, Parted as Friends’, which describes how he acquiesced in the subli-
mation of his own (communist) position by viewpoints ‘violently opposed’ to his own. Tribune,
7 October 1953, 5. 
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It is unnecessary to detail the content of the speeches, the deliberations of the
sub-committees or the findings of the Convention.38 It is quite clear from the
testimony of those delegates attended and reported back to their respective
organisations that the Convention succeeded in its objectives. Genuine ‘shop
floor’ democratic participation had occurred, the divisions of varied political,
social and occupational backgrounds was bridged, and a collective spirit united
by working for peace not preparing for war was achieved. Most important the
principle of patient negotiation—which was as much an organising strategy as a
philosophical position—was enthusiastically endorsed.
Besieged
But these achievements were both shallow and pyrrhic. The Convention was
boycotted, subverted, censored and condemned. The Prime Minister attacked it,
ASIO monitored it, government departments undermined it, and the press—as
we have seen—ignored it. The role of ASIO was especially ubiquitous. Since
1950, it took a close interest in peace activity. In 1951, it created a special sub-
section devoted exclusively to the peace movement which, soon after, it had
successfully penetrated.39 In late July 1953, ASIO requested the Department of
Immigration to refer to it any application to enter Australia to attend the Conven-
tion from any ‘Communist or Fellow Traveller’. No action was to be taken against
‘British subjects’. But because of the instruction that ‘if an application deemed by
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation here to be security risk application
will be refused’, ASIO and the Immigration Department did prevent or deter
entry from ‘aliens’ with a non-British background who were invited. These
included Albert Einstein from the United States, Dimitri Shostakovitch from the
Soviet Union and Emil Zatopek from Czechoslovakia.40
ASIO interference also occurred in more prosaic ways. The principal of
Melbourne University’s Women’s College, Myra Roper, disclosed in late July
1953 that she had been interviewed by a ‘security policeman’ inquiring whether
one of the College’s students had been involved in peace activity.41 Roper
commented that people who were asked to speak on a peace platform now had
256 Australian Historical Studies, 122, 2003
38 See Australian Convention on Peace and War Record, Sydney [1953], 1–16; Youth Forum. Bulletin of the
Youth Committee of the Australian Convention on Peace and War 1, November 1953, 2–8; Hartley, The
Truth Shall Prevail, 96–8.
39 Personal conversation (c.1980) with former ASIO field officer, Jim Love (now deceased), who
worked in this ‘sub-section’. See also ASIO file ‘CPA Interest in the Peace Movement’, NAA
A6122/2, 219.
40 NAA (Victorian Branch) MP 1139/1, 53/38/1113, Memorandum, ‘Secret’, from Secretary,
Department of Immigration, 29 July 1953; NAA A1832/2, 1542/591, Cablegram, ‘Secret’, from
Department of External Affairs: ‘Security. National Convention for Peace—Sydney’.
41 The student was most likely Lucie Fouvy, secretary of the Melbourne University Peace Club; see
letter from President of Students’ Representative Council to Fouvy, 25 May 1953 in Ralph Gibson
papers, UMA, 89:112, BS 3/10/29, Box 8.
03 Deery  15/7/03  5:41 PM  Page 256
to ask themselves whether or not their academic or professional career would be
endangered.42 More significant was ASIO’s relationship with the Prime Minister.
As early as 13 July Colonel Spry, the Director-General of ASIO, wrote to Menzies
informing him that ASIO was placing the Convention on Peace and War under
close surveillance, that it was keeping the Departments of Immigration, External
Affairs and Labour and National Service abreast of ‘security aspects’, and that he,
Spry, could furnish the PM with relevant information if a public statement about
the Convention were necessary. 
In early September Spry wrote to Menzies with ‘further information’ that
clarified and defined, according to Spry, ‘the role of the Communist Party of
Australia in covertly guiding, assisting and publicising the Convention’.43 This
prompted Prime Minister to go public. Menzies telegrammed the Executive
Committee of the Convention beforehand advising that ‘in response to a request’
he would be making a parliamentary statement ‘in [the] interests of [the]
Australian people’.44 In a long statement to the House of Representatives on
16 September, just ten days before the Convention commenced, he alleged
communist manipulation so duplicitous, in fact, that ‘some of the gentlemen who
thought they were initiating the Convention were unaware of its having any
connexion with the … Communist party’. Menzies argued that
It is recognised Communist technique to endeavour to attract to such conferences persons
of standing who are not Communists. The association of good people with these confer-
ences, people with standing, with not a hint of Communism in them, is an end in itself. In
addition, their names are used to add prestige to the individual conference, to any resolu-
tions serving Communist ends which emerge from that conference, and to the ‘Peace’
movement generally.45
An angry Reverend Owen—one of the ‘duped gentlemen’—took up the cudgels
and sought a private meeting with Menzies to assure him that there was no
Communist Party control. This took place in Melbourne on the morning of
Monday 21 September.46 Owen’s interesting account of that meeting was written
only a few months later. There seems little reason to doubt its reliability.
I gave Mr Menzies the whole story as I knew it. I told him that I knew Communists were
interested and were active on the fringe of the movement. But I indicated the care that we
had taken to see that no Communists were allowed to contribute to the actual shaping of
the Convention and … the steps I had taken to prevent this movement from being turned
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into a means of extremist propaganda … I told him of my visit to Sydney [where the possi-
bility of CPA guidance was strongest] and of my close personal investigation of the situa-
tion there. ‘Now Mr Menzies,’ I concluded, ‘tell me, what else could I have done to
safeguard the situation?’ There was a momentary pause and then he replied, ‘Well,
frankly, I can’t see what else you could have done’ … ‘I wish you had said that in public.’
‘I will’, he answered …47
Menzies was true to his word and modified his accusations. He told Parliament
on 22 September that his attack on the Convention was not an attack upon
eminent churchmen. The Rev Owen, he said, was ‘a man whose judgement I
regret, but whose integrity is beyond doubt’. He acknowledged that Owen was ‘a
man of high standing’ who was not a Communist.48 However, he repeated his
charge of communist manipulation of the Convention, a charge that will be
discussed later in this article. Menzies’ two parliamentary statements, on 16 and
22 September, set the tone for a series of denunciations of the Convention, some
vitriolic, from numerous high-ranking government members including Richard
Casey, Harold Holt and John Gorton. All these were given widespread publicity
in the daily press. Letters favourable to the Convention, meanwhile, languished
on the editor’s desk.49 The Liberal government was joined by the Labor Opposi-
tion, influenced by its pre-Split Catholic right constituency, which repudiated the
Convention and threatened members with expulsion if they attended.50
The political offensive was paralleled by a sectarian skirmish. Historically, this
sectarianism had a dark, subterranean presence but, as is well-known, erupted in
1954-55 during the convulsive split in the Labor Party. It was also a divisive
element in 1953 and provided another ingredient in the anti-communist brew
that washed over the Convention. The Catholic press achieved unanimity in its
condemnation of the peace movement.51 The Catholic Tribune simultaneously
attacked Protestantism and Communism:
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The controversy about the ‘Peace Convention’ in Sydney has served to underline a recent
development in Communist ‘infiltration’ which is significant and ominous—namely, the
growing sympathy among Protestant clergymen for certain ideals … favoured by Red
propagandists … [They] believe that Communism is not, in fact, the evil thing that it has
been represented, and that it really stands up for the causes of human well-being and
peace …52
In another editorial Tribune described the apparent tendency of Protestant minis-
ters to align themselves with communists in joint peace activity as ‘a grievous
matter’ and an insult to all Christians who suffered ‘ferocious’ persecution under
communist regimes.53 The Catholic Advocate headlined the Convention as the
‘Latest Move in Communist World Plan’ and condemned those ‘well-meaning
ministers of religion’, along with other ‘Parlour Pinks’ and ‘fellow travellers’, for
supporting such a ‘a bogus front’ with such ‘sinister ends’.54 After the Conven-
tion it devoted a long editorial to ‘The Phenomenon of the “Pink Parson”’ in
which it accused ‘a large and respectable group’ of leading Protestant clergymen
for their ‘dangerous softness’. While they denied, sometimes ‘violently’, all
personal sympathy with the Communist creed, they continually echoed the
Communist line in their public statements. Thus, it was ‘difficult to be patient
with them’, these ‘“modern-minded” Protestants’ who, in effect, refused ‘to stand
for God against His enemies’.55 The Catholic Weekly similarly—and sanctimo-
niously—scorned the ‘group of gullible and impressionable protestant clergymen’
who had been seduced by the Communist Party into thinking they were ‘the
inspirers and promoters of the Convention’56 And, of course, the Convention and
its ‘pro-Communist clergymen’ supporters were condemned, prominently and
stridently, in successive issues of B.A. Santamaria’s News-Weekly.57 The single-
mindedness of Catholic opinion in relation to this issue was disturbed only by
two letters from individual Catholics—Brian Buckley and Vernon Rice—who
expressed support for the goals of the Convention.58 It seems clear, then, that the
Convention on Peace and War brought to the surface some dark, simmering
sectarian tensions.
The Catholic press did not monopolise allegations, at least from ecclesiast-
ical sources, of communist control of the Convention. The N.S.W. Presbyterian
argued: ‘There seems little doubt that the ultimate organising power behind the
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Convention is the Communist Party. Mr Menzies has told us that in Parliament …’59
It instructed its readers not to co-operate with or ‘lend one’s name’ to the Con-
vention since this would endorse its communist line. This injunction pained the
Reverend Owen. In the same paper, weeks after the Convention ended, he
wrote: ‘As I listened to men and women [at the Convention] sincerely struggling
toward mutual understanding and agreement, I felt myself saddened beyond
measure to think that my church, misguidedly standing out of this movement,
was missing this magnificent opportunity’.60
Misguided it may have been but the effect on the Convention of this
combined assault was to seriously dent its chance of success. An early casualty
was one of the original organisers and joint chairmen of the Convention
Committee, the Reverend Dr A. H. Wood. His involvement in peace activity
commenced in 1945, with Hiroshima: ‘I felt that the whole world had changed—
war with atomic bombs could never be just’.61 After Menzies’ parliamentary
attack, which left him ‘saddened beyond words’,62 he withdrew his support and
involvement. Harold Wood was the Principal of Methodist Ladies’ College and he
felt obliged to resign—even though he remained convinced that communists
were not in any way connected to the Convention. The minutes of the Conven-
tion Executive Committee meeting of 19 September indicate his personal
dilemma. ‘I am torn between my duty as a Christian and my obligations to the
School. People who do not know all the facts will criticise me as Head of my
school and the School will suffer’.63 It was not certainly Wood whom Eric Owen
had in mind when he stated that ‘official disapproval was sufficient to induce
some people to retire from the [Convention] movement with almost indecent
haste’.64 In contrast to Wood, one of the Convention’s organising secretaries,
Reverend Long, stated: ‘I have no intention of withdrawing. I shall go on with
the noble work for peace I have been doing for 40 years—long before I ever heard
of communism’.65 Wood’s action received considerable publicity; Long’s decision
received none. 
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The political fall out also expressed itself in several other ways. One was the
attendance figure. In the weeks prior to the Convention, organisers confidently
and repeatedly predicted that more than three thousand would participate; in the
end, only 947 attended. Similarly, it was anticipated that ‘at least 500 delegates
will go from Victoria;’66 only 174 arrived. Eighty-four arrived from other states
and there was one overseas delegate, from New Zealand. Young people had espe-
cially been targeted and high hopes were held out for a ‘Youth Forum’ at the
Convention.67 In the end, a mere forty three delegates classed as ‘Youth &
Students’ attended.68 As the Anglican commented: ‘The moral is clear. Many  who
could have taken a constructive part in this Convention did not do so. They had
been intimidated by a “smear” campaign against it in advance’.69 Attendance
figures are, of course, only one criterion of success. The extent to which the
mobilisation of opinion occurs outside the meeting halls is, arguably, a more
significant if less quantifiable measure. But given the indefatigable efforts of the
State Convention Committees—or at least the Victorian Committee as revealed
in the minutes of its meetings—the number of final participants must have disap-
pointed. There was not only withdrawal of interest. Permission to use several
municipal halls for meetings, film screenings and social functions was also with-
drawn.70 This forced hurried relocations to less central and congenial venues. At
one stage even the all-important opening venue, the Sydney Town Hall was
withdrawn by the City of Sydney municipal council.71 The various Convention
Committees, with their limited sources of funding,72 were no match against the
more powerful forces of a hostile parliament, press and a range of government
instrumentalities.
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Fighting peace
So what underlay Menzies’ war on peace? Few analyses of his government’s
position extend beyond the ‘McCarthyist Cold War atmosphere’ explanation
and they emphasise his visceral, almost irrational, hostility to communism.
But such an explanation begs the question as to why the Menzies government
was so obsessively concerned—and it was a genuine, not contrived concern—
about the peace movement. There were a range of contextual influences
that moulded Menzies’ views in the run-up to the 1953 Convention. Perhaps
the most important was the defence and global war preparations within
Australia and the mobilisation of the national security state.73 Menzies’
believed—to use the striking phrase of one government document—that peace
activity would ‘morally cripple the government’s rearmament programme’74 by
distracting the attention of many Australians away from the menace of inter-
national communism.75
Other factors included the outbreak of the Korean War, which intensified
both domestic anti-communist feeling and the sense of impending interna-
tional crisis,76 the revelations overseas of communist spy rings and espionage
operations, which appeared to confirm the existence of a ‘fifth column’77 and
the perception that, in the now likely event of a third world war, the Comm-
unist Party would act as a subversive agency of a foreign enemy—a perception
aided by the Party’s own actions and language.78 There was a further, impor-
tant determinant of Menzies’ response. It was his conviction that the Australian
peace movement followed closely the directives of the World Peace Council
which, essentially, was a Cominform creation.79 By 1953, Menzies had access
to ample convincing evidence from the Department of External Affairs, Naval
Intelligence, and the British Foreign Office (via the Information Research
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Department) that elaborated and validated these links.80 It was a short step to
the belief that the Convention on Peace and War in effect if not in intent
assisted the so-called ‘Peace Offensive’ of the Soviet Union. Part of that ‘offen-
sive’ was to use the peace movement to sow discord within society, weaken the
resolve and the defence efforts of the West, and compromise the peacekeeping
role of the UN. 
Stripped, therefore, of its colourful language, Menzies would have had little
difficulty accepting this assessment made by an External Affairs officer prior to
the Convention:
The Peace Movement is a revolutionary movement, a cloak by which the Soviet leaders
hope to dissimulate Great Russian Imperialism. Conscious that its guise has been pene-
trated and exposed in many quarters, it continually seeks fresh means to ensnare the wary.
Like shady night club proprietors the Communist promoters are no sooner put out of
business by exposure in one place than they are busy organising a fresh venture under
entirely new management.81
The Convention on Peace and War constituted such a ‘fresh venture’: another
strategy in the Cold War that must be exposed and discredited. Menzies’ convic-
tion that the Convention was a communist front under ‘new management’ was
articulated in his ‘Man to Man’ national broadcast on 25 September 1953:
The Communists are very clever men, naturally much cleverer than their dupes. Their
designs are so treacherous and evil that they would never succeed in Australia except in
disguise. The best Communist disguise, one which they have assumed in almost every free
country, is to put up a ‘front’, a public showing, which appears to be exactly opposite to
Communism … Thus, atheistic Communism, the arch-enemy of Christianity, is willing to
come in behind a Christian clergyman and use his name, provided that he is sufficiently
unaware … It creeps up behind this peace-loving Christian and, by devious means,
encourages a peace propaganda … [I]t is time that we recognised that Communist inspired
peace movements in the democracies are the counterpart of a vast and menacing growth
of war power in the Soviet Union.82
All this was anathema to the non-communist Christian clergymen who
sponsored the Australian Convention on Peace and War. For them ‘defence
policy’ was a euphemism for an armaments build-up. For them, to remain silent
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or inert was to remain an accomplice in the government’s war preparations. And
for them, nothing could sanctify modern war; nothing could defile the cause of
peace. Better relations between East and West was their goal, patient negotiation
their favoured means. And they denied vigorously and repeatedly that they were
hoodwinked by clever communist manipulators. By reducing them to dupes,
such allegations denigrate their intelligence, integrity and capacity to think in
ways independent from but, at least in peace work, parallel to the CPA. Many
clergymen and most of the Convention organisers, such as St. Clair Anderson,
Owen, Brand, Long and Wood, had commenced their involvement with the
peace movement long before peace activists were seen as synonymous with
fellow travellers and crypto communists and long before the communist-influ-
enced Australian Peace Council was formed in July 1949.83
A Communist ‘front’?
The broader issue of Communist Party control of the Australian Peace Council
(APC) has been extensively canvassed.84 Suffice it to say that despite constant
denials from the APC,85 the Communist Party was the early driving force behind
it. This close involvement in the establishment of the APC was confirmed by an
‘insider’—its first organising secretary, Ian Turner: ‘The post-war Australian peace
movement had its origin in a top-secret meeting of party members … early in
1949. That meeting agreed to initiate a broadly-based Australian Peace Council’.86
This issue, of CPA initiation of postwar peace activism, is not of direct relevance
here but the extent of CPA control over the 1953 Convention is. The alleged
communist connection was the linchpin of the combined assault on the Conven-
tion and the effectiveness with which the charges were hurled severely circum-
scribed its success. Menzies’ claim that the Convention was a communist front
relied heavily on his use of information, intelligence and internal CPA documents
supplied by ASIO. The evidence Menzies used in his statement to the House was
an address ‘to a select [Communist] Party group’ by an unnamed high-ranking
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member; a resolution ‘passed by a senior Committee of the Communist Party’
outlining tactics to be used at the Convention; the decision by the CPA to establish
‘a working committee for the Convention’’; and the directive to a member of the
Central Committee to assume ‘general political leadership and responsibility of
the Convention’.87 The following day newspapers headlined his speech with ‘P.M.
Reveals Top Red’s Order to Party’ and ‘Communists Behind Peace Convention,
Says P.M.’88 The ‘secret documents’ from which Menzies—and press political
reporters—generously quoted gave the allegations verisimilitude. Assertion was
fast becoming fact. But not for those who were actually organising the Convention.
Immediately after Reverend J.E. Owen met with Menzies on 21 September,
he met with ASIO. In a remarkable twist, Menzies arranged by phone, possibly
with Spry himself, that Owen see the actual ASIO documents: ‘Show him every-
thing, anything he wants to look at’.89 To see classified documents dealing with
communism, especially in 1953, was highly irregular but Menzies was anxious
that Owen, whom he obviously trusted, be convinced of communist complicity.
Owen pored over the incriminating documents with the Director General and the
officer ‘in charge of the file’ and saw names, connections and affiliations. Accord-
ing to Spry, ‘it appeared to me that he had been if not convinced, at least surprised
by the documents produced’.90 In fact, Owen was not convinced: ‘I saw the
names of men whom I had long suspected of being Communists … I saw the
names of men who had kept their affiliations with the Communist Party as
discreetly hidden as they could, but … I saw no names that I or my friends had
not already suspected.’91 What Owen discovered is that ASIO, and therefore
Menzies, had conflated two peace conventions—one planned but never held by
the Communist Party; the other, with which he was associated, due to commence
in five days’ time. This was a remarkable revelation. It certainly cast Menzies’
parliamentary statement in a different light. Owen felt ASIO acknowledged, albeit
perfunctorily, that its ‘proof’ was circumstantial rather than prima facie. When he
finished examining all the ‘secret documents’, he asked the officers present:
Will you let me sum up what I have seen, and then tell me if I am correct or not? … I
believe that you have evidence here that the Communists planned to hold one of their
Peace Conferences in Sydney early in this year; that subsequently they got wind of the fact
that we were in the field; that they then decided to drop theirs and swing in behind ours;
that they have been very close to the movement in Sydney in the planning of the machin-
ery of the Convention; but there is no evidence that they have either wished to influence
the nature of the Convention, the matter to be discussed, the manner of discussing it, or
the conclusions to be arrived at, or have succeeded in doing so. One of the men replied,
‘I think that is fairly accurate’.92
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If this testimony is reliable, and comments from both sides of the political fence
regarding Owen’s integrity93 suggest that it would be, then the edifice, upon
which allegations of communist control rested, collapses. The file that ASIO
compiled, that Owen saw and that Menzies used is now available to historians.
The key documents were a set of eleven small note-pad size pages taken from
the ‘left side drawer of J.D. Blake’s desk’ at CPA headquarters in Sydney, and a
three page set of rough and rather disorganised notes taken from the ‘gent’s
wardrobe’ at the home of H.B. Chandler.94 The authors of these notes—the first
was handwritten, the second typed—were not identified. However it is clear that
the handwriting, scrawled and nearly illegible, belonged to Jack Blake.95 It is not
clear whether ASIO knew this; if so, which is likely, it would gleefully have
interpreted ‘we ask responsible citizens to join with us in leading and preparing
this great convention’ as conclusive proof of communist initiation and manip-
ulation. Blake, after all, was in 1953 a member of the highest-ranking CPA
committee—the three person Central Committee Secretariat—and, arguably,
the most influential CPA leader until forced to resign in 1954 after an internal
power struggle.96 So this document was a real catch. Except that Owen was
right: it referred to a communist-organised National Peace Convention
which the Central Committee previously planned. With the emergence of the
Australian Convention on Peace and War, initiated by the clergy-based Peace
Quest Committee, the Communist Party switched strategy: ‘we have had to
change those plans and make different ones’.97
Further, if less authoritative, evidence that the Convention was not a ‘Red
Front’ comes from the Communist Party’s own assessment of the event. Identical
editorials, written by J.D. Blake, appeared in the communist papers Tribune and
The Guardian. After applauding the work of the Convention and attacking the
methods of the Menzies government  (it used ‘every weapon in the arsenal of
the secret police from crude forgery to outright intimidation’), they stated:
By negotiation, discussion and a genuine spirit of give and take, the Convention reached
conclusions of a limited character which were acceptable to all participants. There are
some aspects of these findings with which we do not agree, but they express the views
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of non-Communist people who desire peace. On all other matters contained in the
unanimous findings of the Convention the Communist Party has a much more far-
reaching policy, and the Party will continue its own work for this policy.98
Notwithstanding Blake’s policy, throughout 1952–53, of broadening the peace
movement and, correspondingly, diminishing Party domination, such a state-
ment—with its caveats and qualifications—would be unthinkable were the
Convention a creature of the Communist Party. A comparison with the 1952
Youth Carnival for Peace and Friendship also held in Sydney, is instructive. That
major event was organised primarily by the CPA via a ‘front’ organisation, the
Eureka Youth League. In none of the many assessments of the Carnival, public
or internal, did the Party allude to any aspect being of ‘limited character’ or a
source of disagreement. Instead the lessons drawn were necessarily profound,
salutary, far-reaching.99 With the Carnival, the Party was omnipotent; with the
Convention, it was subordinate. The ideological myopia of cold warriors blurred
such subtleties. It prevented distinctions being seen between desire and outcome,
influence and control. The Cold War polarities meant that, in the 1950s, any
peace work ipso facto assisted, or was assisted by, the Communist Party. Guilt by
association, that emblematic feature of this troubled, tense period, applied to the
peace movement. Peace parsons, if not already pink, were easily duped and
therefore made naive but valuable allies on the side of Soviet communism in the
great world struggle for moral and military supremacy.
Legacy
The aftermath of the Convention saw ‘report back’ meetings and rallies in
October 1953.100 But the heady rhetoric expressed on the final evening of the
Convention—‘we will save the peace of Australia and we will save the peace of
the world’—withered beyond the Convention halls where the Cold War air was
far more chilly. Soon, audiences dwindled and preaching was to the converted.
The hoped-for momentum inspired by those days in September that would
sweep up masses of previously uncommitted Australians to the cause of peace
quickly ebbed as 1953 drew to a close. The Australian Peace Council, the Peace
Quest Forum and the Society of Friends Peace Committee, all important backers
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of the Convention, fell collectively silent on previously-announced plans to hold
a further National Peace Convention in Melbourne in 1954.101 In fact, even if
Menzies had not announced the Petrov defection in April 1954, against which
the peace movement could not compete and with which it would, most likely,
have been tarred with the broad brush of espionage, it seems highly improbable
that any significant peace activity would have been undertaken in 1954. This
was a far cry from the frenetic activity, outlined at the outset of this article, in the
early 1950s. Not for another six years, with the 1959 Peace Congress in
Melbourne, was anything on the scale of the 1953 Convention attempted. The
Menzies Government had succeeded in discrediting, isolating and marginalising
the peace movement. 
Besides the shaft of light it throws on the broader issue of anti-communism
in the early 1950s, particularly the alleged synonymy of peace and communism,
an examination of the Australian Convention on Peace and War revises our
customary perceptions of the post-war years, ‘our contemporary imaginings of
a flat, complacent and largely uneventful period’.102 It reveals that the twin issues
of war and peace made the early 1950s a turbulent and fragmented period. These
issues were interpreted in radically different ways by different sections of society.
They were, therefore, a source of tension rather than consensus. The invasion
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threat of World War II united, at least temporarily, the community. The apoc-
alyptic threat of World War III strained and polarised it. On the battleground
of the Cold War a wide gulf existed between the combatants; any effort to enter
the no-man’s land of political neutrality, such as the attempt by the Convention
clergymen, was condemned. In this sense the friction between the Menzies
government and the peace movement foreshadowed some of the bitter conflicts
that characterised Australian society fifteen years later during the Vietnam war.
But by then ‘peace’ was no longer such a wicked word. 
Victoria University
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